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Conducting Field Research on Terrorism: a Brief Primer
by Adam Dolnik
Abstract
This article focuses on the practical aspects of field research on terrorism. Firstly, it  outlines 
some issues involved in the process of attaining a human research ethics/institutional review 
board clearance in order to be able to even begin the field research. It suggests some ways in 
which researchers can positively influence this review process in their favor. Secondly, the article 
focuses on the real and perceived dangers of field research, identifying practical steps and 
preparatory activities that can help researchers manage and reduce the risks involved. The 
article also covers the formalities and dilemmas involved in gaining access to the field. It then 
provides some insights into the topic of operating in conflict zones, followed by a section 
covering the ways of gaining access to sources, effective communication skills and influence 
techniques and addresses key issues involved in interviewing sources in the field. The final 
section focuses on identifying biases and interfering factors which researchers need to take into 
account when interpreting the data acquired through interviews. This article is a modest attempt 
to fill a gap in the literature on terrorism research by outlining some of the key issues involved in 
the process of doing field research. It incorporates insights from diverse disciplines as well as 
the author’s personal experiences of conducting field research on terrorism in places like 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Colombia, Mindanao, Uganda, Indonesia, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, and India.
Introduction
In the last 10 years arguably no other field in the social sciences has witnessed as great of an 
increase in academic output as the discipline known as Terrorism Studies. This has resulted in 
greatly enhanced understanding of specific contemporary topics such as Al-Qaeda, radical Islam, 
the radicalization process, terrorist uses of the internet, suicide terrorism, terrorist financing, 
home-grown terrorism, de-radicalisation and disengagement from terrorism, and the challenges 
non-state actors face in acquiring and weaponising chemical and biological agents. But while this 
exponential increase in terrorism literature has led to a welcome broadening of the scope of 
perspectives and approaches to studying the phenomenon, comparatively little attention has been 
devoted to attempts to systematically develop the quality of the Terrorism Studies discipline 
itself. For instance, while a new book on terrorism comes out roughly every 6 hours, only three 
books evaluating the state of the field and its future directions have been published in the last 10 
years.[1] All three of these books as well as many recent panels of Terrorism Studies specialists 
tasked with evaluating the state of the discipline have unequivocally called for more historical 
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comparative research across different contexts, increased effort to incrementally build on past 
research conducted by other authors,[2] and above all, the need for more first hand research.[3]
Field research on terrorism has traditionally been surrounded by many myths, and has been 
called anything from “necessary” and “crucial” to “dangerous”, “unethical” and “impossible”. 
But despite common assumptions that such research is inherently difficult and dangerous, the 
fact is that many authors have over the years proven such assumptions to be unfounded. 
According to Silke, “the idea that terrorism research is inevitably highly dangerous and risky is 
mistaken.”[4] The key, of course, is experience and a prior understanding of the issues involved, 
as well as the researcher’s ability to anticipate likely developments and to adjust accordingly. But 
while there is an increasing interest among terrorism specialists in conducting field research, not 
a single volume that would provide prospective field researchers with a crucial starting point 
currently exists.[5] This article will attempt to address this critical gap by providing some 
preliminary practical insights into the challenges of such fieldwork, based on an interdisciplinary  
literature review as well the author’s personal experiences of conducting field research on 
terrorism in countries as diverse as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Chechnya, Colombia, southern 
Philippines, northern Uganda, Indonesia, northeast Democratic Republic of Congo, and southern 
Sudan. Obviously, it is impossible to cover all the issues in a journal-length article without 
sacrificing crucial details, country- and group-specific aspects ( particular cultural and gender 
concerns), while also avoiding the danger of slipping into an autobiographical mode and war-
story telling when providing supporting evidence. To deal with these challenges, this article 
seeks to address only conceptual issues common to terrorism field research in general, and 
reserves concrete experiences and specific examples for the endnotes.[6] In addition, it is 
important to emphasize that it is not the ambition of this article to replace the wide body of 
relevant literature covering the theoretical foundations and conceptual frameworks of qualitative 
research methods. Rather it is meant to supplement this literature with practical insights relevant 
to research on terrorism in conflict zones.
More specifically, the article will attempt to briefly address planning and preparation phases, 
Institutional Review Board (IRB)/Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) processes, 
formalities involved in getting into conflict zones, means of gaining access to sources and 
managing contacts, issues involved in interviewing militants in the field, a discussion on the risks 
involved, research ethics dilemmas, translation and interpretational issues, effective interviewing 
and rapport building steps, as well as other practical aspects such as the impact of such research 
on the researcher. The article will also attempt to help researchers set realistic expectations of 
how the process of interviewing militants and secretive government sources in conflict zones is 
organized, what the likely outcomes are, how to handle self-introduction among different 
interviewee audiences and how to navigate through challenges posed by government forces 
unsympathetic to researchers, how to reduce risk of physical harm when traveling in conflict 
zones, etc. The end product will be a preliminary “how to” guide to field research on terrorism, 
which will also serve as an invitation to the many highly experienced colleagues in the field to 
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share their fieldwork experiences, in order to assist the next generation of terrorism specialists in 
raising the standard of the Terrorism Studies discipline.[7] 
The Need for Field Research
The field of Terrorism Studies has received considerable criticism for being overly event-driven, 
essentially descriptive in nature, relying on weak research methods,[8] focusing in isolation on 
individual groups (especially those that dominate the policy- and media discourse at the time), 
and for a very limited effort to build on past research conducted by other author.[9] In addition, 
considerable self-reflective criticism within the field has focused on the fact that much of the 
Terrorism Studies literature does not incorporate field research. According to Silke, “very few 
published attempts have been made to systematically study terrorists outside of a prison 
setting,”[10] confirming Crenshaw’s observation that “the study of terrorism still lacks the 
foundation of extensive primary data based on interviews and life histories of individuals 
engaged in terrorism”.[11] Silke concludes: “for a dramatic phenomenon of such intense interest 
to the media and wider world, such gapping hopes in the literature are nothing short of 
stunning.”[12] This point has also become a lynchpin for the somewhat dubious discipline of 
“Critical Terrorism Studies”, the proponents of which have also argued that “terrorism analysts 
rarely bother to interview or engage with those involved in ‘terrorist activity’ or spend any time 
on the ground in the areas most affected by conflict.”[13] But the fact is that the relative lack of 
field research has long been recognized from within the Terrorism Studies discipline as well, and 
many terrorism analysts have in recent years made a significant effort to rectify this problem.[14] 
Needless to say, while terrorism research does not easily lend itself to reliable, valid and 
systematic exploration in the field,[15] there are many ways through which field research on 
terrorism can contribute to our understanding of the causes, dynamics, and manifestations of 
terrorism and political violence. Firstly, given the highly emotional and subjective nature of the 
terrorism phenomenon, available data tends to be strongly politically manipulated by all sides, 
requiring a higher standard of verification to ensure the reliability and accuracy of findings. This 
is especially true for historical campaigns that had taken place in environments where the 
government possessed a virtual monopoly on the dissemination of information to the outside 
world. For researching such cases, field research becomes absolutely essential. This is especially 
true given the historical tendency of researchers to rely heavily on citing each other’s work, 
which has led to the creation of a highly unreliable closed and circular research system, 
functioning in a constantly reinforcing feedback loop.[16] This then results in the common 
acceptance of various unsupported myths, which serve as foundations of “knowledge” in the 
field until proven otherwise.[17] The end product is the exponential proliferation and tacit 
validation of mistakes made by researchers, their assistants, interpreters, etc., which has led to 
recording of inaccurate data, including incorrect names, places, casualty figures, and even the 
creation of terrorist attack plots and case which never happened.[18] Today’s terrorism research 
simply requires fieldwork in order to break this debilitating cycle. 
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Secondly, much of the current research relies on the government perspective, which brings its 
own biases. For instance, while effective governmental countermeasures are consistently cited as 
one of the key historical reasons leading to the decline of terrorist groups, effective tools for 
measuring success in counterterrorism remain largely nonexistent,[19] and contemporary 
research tends to be further skewed by factors such as comparatively easier access to government 
data and the one-sided nature of research funding[20]  (in this respect terrorism research is 
sometimes reminiscent of lung cancer research funded by a tobacco company).[21] 
Unsurprisingly, this situation leads researchers to stress the role of government policies as the 
decisive factor in the decline of terrorist violence,[22] even though such a claim rarely takes the 
form of a testable proposition. As observed by A. K. Cronin, the extent to which terrorist 
campaigns transform independently of government countermeasures thus remains among a long 
list of questions we currently lack reliable answers to.[23] Field research and interviews with 
perpetrators and organizers of terrorist violence are crucial in providing at least some 
counterbalance to this inherent and largely unavoidable bias. 
Thirdly, secondary source data is frequently incorrect on crucial details. This is especially true 
with respect to historical cases that occurred prior to the age of electronic media in countries 
where access to any reliable and independent sources was practically non-existent. For instance, 
in my research on terrorist innovation[24], I have relied on the meticulous chronological work of 
Mickolus and his colleagues, who have filled thousands of pages with detailed information on all 
terrorist incidents recorded since 1968.[25] After having had the chance to interview dozens of 
perpetrators, witnesses, victims and investigators of many of the historical attacks recorded in 
those chronologies, I found that many of the details were simply incorrect. Sometimes the dates 
were wrong, in most cases the casualty figures were uncertain or disputed, there would be at least  
3 interpretations of who was behind any given attack and why (including multiple conspiracy 
theories), there would be multiple claims of responsibility, the details of the specific modus 
operandi were frequently subject to the guessing and imagination of the reporter, and my overall 
impression and understanding of practically any historical attack changed dramatically after 
researching it in the field. This is not to take anything away from the very helpful work of 
Mickolus and his colleagues; it simply highlights the fact that because of the inherent 
deficiencies in access to historical data, it is important to engage in more rigorous efforts of 
cross-checking the facts of specific cases via field research. 
Importantly, there is a cultural element that is crucial in determining the level of trust with which 
one approaches government data. While during interviews with investigators of the 7/7 
bombings in the UK, the researcher can have a high level of confidence in the accuracy of the 
details provided, it would be a mistake to extend the same level of trust to highly controversial 
cases such as the 1979 hostage takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca or the 2004 Beslan 
school siege, where existing versions are strongly politically manipulated by all sides. In 
investigating such cases, field research is simply unavoidable if the researcher is to have any 
confidence in his or her ability to describe what actually transpired. And since much of our 
analysis of the terrorist’s intentions, tactics, strategy, and possible countermeasures depends on 
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the ability to accurately reconstruct specific events, the fact is that in most cases this cannot be 
accurately done from open sources alone. 
Fourthly, although there is a considerable amount of data “from the horse’s mouth” available 
through interviews with terrorists published in mainstream electronic and print media, the fact is 
that many of the questions asked in such media interviews are designed to trigger a “soundbite” 
response, as opposed to seeking deeper and more complex insights. In addition, when terrorists 
speak to the media they have a clear goal of spreading a particular type of message depending on 
the target audience. Needless to say, if given the chance, terrorism researchers would frequently 
ask different questions, in a different setting and in a different way, thus very likely triggering 
different responses. This, of course, depends on the given researcher’s rapport and level of trust 
with the interviewee, but the point is that a deeper access to terrorists via in-depth interviews has 
a great deal to offer over the selective “plugging in” of quotes from media interviews we as 
analysts frequently engage in. This is especially true given the fact that most terrorists speak 
differently, based on the media outlet the interview is for, and the specific target audience they 
are trying to influence. This does not mean that in interviews conducted by researchers such 
problems do not exist; at the same time, conducting the interview personally allows the 
researcher to ask follow-up questions that help test the validity and reliability of the answers.
And finally, field research is about so much more than data collection. In fact, it could be argued 
that it is the process itself that plays the more crucial role of educating the researcher and 
deepening his or her knowledge about the context, and everyday realities in which the 
perpetrators, supporters, and victims of terrorism operate. This exposure to reality alone can 
rapidly change the researcher’s perceptions on many different fronts. Quite simply, one can read 
all available books and sources on a particular terrorist campaign, but without field visits and 
exposure to the environment there is much tacit knowledge the researcher simply will not be 
aware of. In many ways it is the “just looking factor”[26] of field research that by itself justifies 
its benefits. 
Human Research Ethics Review Process
The concept of human research ethics initially came to prominence in the aftermath of the 
Nuremburg trials, which uncovered the shocking nature of Nazi medical experiments. Over time, 
the issue received further attention due to specific controversial projects, such as Stanley 
Milgram’s obedience/compliance experiment, Philip Zimbardo’s infamous Stanford Prison 
Experiment, or the recently revisited 1940s National Institutes of Health (NIH) funded study, in 
which US public health researchers infected hundreds of people in Guatemala with syphilis and 
gonorrhea without their consent.[27] Today, most universities and public research institutions in 
Western countries have an internal human research ethics/institutional review body, which has to 
approve any research involving human subjects. By the very nature of the field of study, 
terrorism research raises many questions from the human research ethics perspective, and this 
frequently becomes the biggest challenge of the entire process of terrorism field research. For 
instance, some of the regulations (i.e.: all subjects should be treated as equally and as justly as 
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possible during the research) are practically impossible to fulfill, because terrorism is 
fundamentally about two groups that are in conflict with one another and as observed by 
Jackson, for some groups “maintaining beneficence for the population and protecting all the 
individuals involved seems absolutely impossible.”[28] Also, given the nature of terrorism 
research, there is a frequent conflict between the interests of the research funders and the people 
who are being studied, and some research results are likely to assist in formulation of 
governmental counterterrorism efforts, which in essence seek to deliberately undermine the 
“well-being” of “participants”.[29] How does one achieve a balance of risks and benefits in an 
environment in which “benefits” to the funders (states) in increasing their counterterrorism 
capability are achieved by causing “harm” to the research participants (terrorists)? 
As a result of this core problem, practically no field activity in this area will fall into the category 
of ‘low risk research’ (defined as research in which the only foreseeable risk is one of 
discomfort)[30] and thus it is highly likely that researchers will have to go through the dreadful 
Institutional Review Board (IRB)/Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) process prior to 
commencing their project.[31] In most cases, the IRB/HREC members will have limited 
understanding of terrorism research so practically any project in this field will raise alarm. In 
addition, the members of such committees are rarely active researchers, and the dynamic is such 
that there is a premium on nitpicking and identifying problems with any proposal, so for a 
terrorism researcher this can be a highly frustrating exercise. This is especially the case when 
HREC/IRB members mechanically demand documents such as copies of letters of invitation to 
participate in research, sample questionnaires, participant information packages, copies of all 
documents and other material used to inform potential participants about the research including 
advertisements, consent forms, proxy/substitute consent forms, debriefing information, contact 
detail cards, etc. 
When dealing with this process, there are several specific issues to consider. At the most basic 
level, the ethicality of research is determined by calculating whether the potential benefits of the 
research outweigh its risks.[32] As a result, the issue of a human research ethics clearance will 
require a great degree of interpretation of what constitutes risks and benefits of such research. 
Further, as cited in the Australian National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research, 
the ethical guidelines outlined in the document “are not simply a set of rules. Their application 
should not be mechanical. It always requires, from each individual, deliberation on the values 
and principles, exercise of judgment, and an appreciation of context.”[33] It remains a fact, 
however, that most IRB’s/HRECs may not be in a position to appreciate the context of much of 
terrorism research, despite their unquestionable and sincerest effort to do so. Consequently, many 
clearance granting bodies tend to apply ethical research principles (initially designed to deal with 
ethical issues involved in clinical trials) rather mechanically, which in turn can make the research 
practically impossible, since the on-the-ground political realities of countries plagued by crime, 
corruption, conflict and terrorism are markedly different from the controlled laboratory settings 
that inform IRB/HREC requirements. 
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First of all, in many cases the interviews will be highly opportunistic, and the questions 
researchers will ask will be determined by the nature and expertise of each specific respondent 
they are able to get access to, which, in turn, is something that cannot be predicted before 
actually attempting to make contact in the field. In such situations, providing advance lists of 
persons to be interviewed and copies of sample questionnaires makes little sense, since the 
situation is often fluid and even meetings arranged in advance frequently do not materialize. 
Similarly, in conflict settings the concept of each interviewee signing a consent form or any other 
document is completely ludicrous, as it will not only ruin the researcher’s credibility due to fears 
of espionage; being asked to sign documents will also automatically trigger fear of manipulation 
of the signature for fake confessions by government forces. Finally, in interviews with members 
of communities involved in political violence, it is in the best interest of the research participants 
that they be provided deniability of having had any substantial contact with the researcher, as this 
can lead to subsequent arrest, prolonged interrogation, and even torture in the hands of 
government troops. As such, the IRB/HRECs routine requirement of signed consent forms 
constitute an unjustifiable risk to the participants, which is somewhat ironic given that the stated 
purpose of human research ethics committees is to “protect the welfare and rights of participants 
involved in research.”[34] As observed by Jackson, “standard application of [ethical] 
requirement across all terrorism research may risk producing some rather perverse outcomes, - 
some of which … go against fundamental intent of the regulations themselves.”[35] 
To assist researchers with the IRB/HREC review process, here are some of the ethical issues that 
are frequently raised by these bodies in relation to terrorism research. Firstly, when dealing with 
governmental sources, the one issue that always arises is secrecy and level of classification of the 
particular information being conveyed during an interview. In reality however, government 
sources are very well aware of what type of information they can provide, and typically abide by 
a  “when in doubt do not disclose” policy. Occasionally, members of security services do choose 
to convey information that they deem to be sensitive – accompanied by the request not to be 
cited. Given ethical considerations as well as the importance of reputation, credibility and 
trustworthiness in the field, the researcher is naturally motivated to abide by such a request. 
Moreover, in most cases it is not difficult to fulfill such requests, as the information at hand can 
often be traced to an existing open source, which allows an academically viable citation of the 
data without resorting to attribution to a classified source. In fact, since it is frequently estimated 
that around 90 percent of all information possessed by intelligence agencies is available in open 
sources, the key challenge in Terrorism Studies is not so much acquiring the information, but 
rather navigation through the “noise” in order to distinguish which of the many versions of 
events available in the public domain are credible. This is where classified sources and 
interviews with investigators, witnesses and direct participants of specific events are 
exceptionally useful, as they can help the researcher navigate through the jungle of open sources. 
The second ethical question that is often raised in relation to interviewing perpetrators and 
victims of political violence is the issue of emotional distress caused to the interviewee during 
the process of recollecting specific violent events. The bottom line is that since extreme violence 
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is at the core of the research field itself, it is simply impossible to fully eliminate such a risk, no 
matter how sensitive the researcher may be in trying to avoid questions that could trigger painful 
memories. At the same time, the researcher can minimize the risks involved by acknowledging 
his or her understanding of the emotional difficulty of the interview process, and can offset the 
negative impact of emotional recollection by empathetic listening, and by providing the 
interviewee with the opportunity to recollect positive images associated with their grief (i.e. 
victims speaking about the death of their loved ones would be provided the opportunity to speak 
about happy memories of time together, etc.). Especially when dealing with people who feel 
victimized and neglected, the therapeutic effect of having been heard cannot be overemphasized,
[36] and provides a much better alternative to the common HREC/IRB’s requirement that the 
researcher should be responsible for offering psychological counseling services to interviewees 
that could potentially be traumatized. Though undoubtedly well intentioned, such a suggestion 
completely misses the mark, as in most countries the issue of “psychological health” is reserved 
for the mentally ill, and offering such services to an interviewee will frequently be perceived as 
calling the person “crazy”. The point is that the importance of being sensitive to the frequently 
unimaginable psychological trauma experienced by interviewees, (whether they are on the giving 
or the receiving end of political violence, or both), is clear. This reality becomes immediately 
obvious to anyone once they are sitting face to face with former child soldiers who were forced 
to beat their own mothers or siblings to death as part of initiation, only to later engage in similar 
brutalities, including rape and forced cannibalism; or former hostages who saw their own 
children killed in heavy handed rescue operations; or villagers whose sons were brutally tortured 
to death by government troops; or terrorists who all too frequently crave attention and express 
cold blooded pride when talking about killing, while at the same time showing considerable 
emotion when talking about the deaths of their own loved ones. Perhaps it is not the HREC/IRB 
that is best positioned to issue theoretical advice on how to handle such situations, and it should 
be left to the researcher who has intimate knowledge of the conflict and the necessary 
experience. 
The third frequently raised ethical issue concerns the risk of interviewees disclosing details about  
their involvement in illegal activity, which could later be used against them in a court of law. To 
what extent does the principle of confidentiality apply to such cases? What should the researcher 
do if in the course of research he or she uncovers specific information about an impeding attack? 
In this case again, there is no clear-cut answer. Fortunately, this scenario is rather hypothetical, 
since in most interviews terrorists tend to avoid this level of detail, frequently claiming to be 
falsely accused of involvement in “terrorism” by the state. In some cases, terrorists will talk 
about their involvement in “illegal activity”, but this is typically in reference to activities of a 
political nature, which they see as justifiable or even admirable (or for which they have already 
been sentenced), and thus see no point in disguising their involvement. Further, if the 
interviewees are willing to share their involvement in illegal activities with a Western researcher, 
they are likely to be willing to share it with anyone. And since terrorism researchers will rarely 
speak to anyone who has not been already interviewed by local or international media, they are 
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extremely unlikely to end up in a situation where they have exclusive access to incriminating 
details about specific criminal activity that has occurred in the past, and absolutely unlikely to 
learn about any new specific threats for the future. 
Fourthly, there is a somewhat curious tendency of IRB’s/HRECs to focus on protecting an ethical 
norm, at the expense of focus on protecting the researcher.[37] It is often assumed that in the 
relationship to research participants the researcher has the upper hand, and since the ethics 
process is designed to protect “vulnerable research populations”, much of the burden is placed on 
the researcher in a one-sided way. But is this really appropriate in the context of terrorism 
research? The notion that an academic sitting with gunmen in their stronghold is the more 
powerful figure in the relationship, and that the gunmen constitute a “vulnerable population” is 
somewhat bizarre. In this case the situation is reversed, or at the very least, both sides are 
“equally unsafe.”[38] In addition to this lopsided view of the researcher-participant relationship, 
the IRB models also do not address the issue of potential exploitation of the researcher by the 
respondents, which is a major omission given the fact that research subjects frequently regard the 
research process as a quid pro quo relationship.[39] 
This is associated with another ethical issue, and that is the possibility of interviewees gaining a 
false impression that agreeing to an interview will somehow lead to direct improvement of their 
personal situation. For example, villagers that have been subject to harsh treatment in the hands 
of the terrorists or the government troops may falsely hope that their participation in the project 
will result in the public exposition of their suffering, leading to possible material compensation 
from either government sources or the international community. Similarly, combatants often ask 
for favours directly, whether it is money, donation of computers or generators, assistance in 
immigration issues, passing gifts to family members living in the researcher’s home country, or 
even university scholarships to study at the researcher’s home institution. This puts the 
researcher in a highly uncomfortable position, as providing some of the requested assistance is 
not only time-consuming, difficult and costly, it can also be illegal if it is branded as providing 
assistance to a terrorist organization. Some reciprocal favors are naturally frequently needed to 
aid in establishing research access in the first place (e.g. buying the respondent tea or lunch, or 
bringing small toys for his kids), but it is a good idea for researchers to make it clear right in the 
beginning of the interview that “while the project cannot benefit [the respondent] personally, the 
knowledge gained can be useful in saving lives in the future.” This has proven to be a generally 
persuasive approach, which motivates respondents to participate, while also pre-empting any 
false hopes for personal gain. This does not mean that attempts at eliciting reciprocal favors from 
the researcher will not be made, but the point is to reduce expectations from the start. Then with 
experience, researchers can expect to become conditioned and rather resilient to this reality, and 
will develop ways of pre-empting and turning down such requests in an elegant way that does 
not damage relationships. 
Another ethical dilemma lies in the interview process itself. As emphasized later in this article, 
effective interviewing takes skill and practice, and involves active listening, a nonjudgmental 
attitude, and sometimes validating the respondents’ core views in order to build rapport. This, of 
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course, takes discipline and training oneself to empathize with views of people that contradict or 
even deeply offend our own, and to refrain from trying to persuade them or challenge them.[40] 
At the same time, this approach potentially raises an ethical dilemma, in the possibility of the 
researcher being viewed as a “legitimizer” of terrorist violence.[41] One way out of this dilemma 
is to apply an approach commonly used by hostage negotiators, who look for empathetic ways to 
acknowledge or validate the legitimate grievances behind the militants’ actions while carefully 
differentiating these from the actions themselves. [42] This process makes it harder for the 
terrorists to label the interviewer/negotiator as unreasonable, creates chances to de-escalate the 
situation emotionally, and can help create a wedge between their grievances and their actions, 
which, in turn, may help them to question the connection.[43] Not only is this approach useful in 
avoiding a potentially dangerous exchange of views, it can even build more respect for the 
interviewer than mechanically agreeing with everything that is said, which is an action the 
genuineness of which will likely be questioned. Still, it is a good idea to refrain from actively 
contributing one’s own view on the matters of discussion unless the interviewee specifically asks 
for the researcher’s opinion.
Overall, the two key issues of human research ethics involve “informed consent” and 
“confidentiality”. The problem is that in the field of terrorism research, these issues can 
frequently be in conflict with one another, as insistence on signed consent forms to satisfy the 
former can endanger the fulfillment of the latter  (confidentiality), in the scenario that the 
researcher is detained by government forces and all his or her belongings are searched and 
confiscated. And while informed consent is undeniably important, the assumption that the 
researcher or the IRB/HREC will be more aware of the risks to potential research participants 
than the participants themselves is hardly justified. Quite simply, people engaged in everyday 
survival in conflict zones have an acute awareness of the risks posed by talking to journalists or 
researchers, and when in doubt they tend to decline participation. In some cases, the approached 
candidates are willing to talk, often agreeing to take significant risks to tell their story, simply 
because they think that it is important. In such cases, should it not be up to them, rather than an 
ivory tower ethics committee, to make the cost-benefit calculation? The case for this argument is 
especially strong in relation to militants actively engaging in armed conflict. Since these men and 
women willingly take extraordinary risks in their daily “occupation”, and since their mission is 
defined by inflicting bodily harm, should the issue of their own “safety” during participation in 
research not be treated with greater leniency than in cases involving other vulnerable and 
disadvantaged researched populations? This is especially the case when the research complies 
with a strict security protocol dictated by the research participants themselves, often forcing the 
researcher to put him or herself in potentially dangerous situations in order to protect the 
participants. 
Another issue is: what actually constitutes informed consent, and how much specific information 
should the researcher be obligated to disclose in order to establish this principle? Should the 
researcher, for instance, be obligated to disclose the source of funding? As Fair points out, in 
places like Afghanistan or Pakistan, disclosing that the research is funded by “US government” 
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will almost universally trigger the perception that the researcher is a spy funded by the CIA, and 
this can of course be detrimental not only to the research project, but to the well-being of the 
researcher as well.[44] Along the same lines, there is a practical need to negotiate different trust 
relationships with the state actor who needs to be persuaded about the harmless or even 
beneficial role of the researcher’s activities in the conflict zone in order to allow access, and 
completely different trust relationships with the research participants who are at war with this 
state actor. This can pose a serious dilemma to researchers, as self-introduction and rapport 
building with these disparate actors requires different approaches and even different versions.
[45] Do such rhetorical gymnastics involving slight changes in vocabulary and disclosed 
“opinions” on the conflict depending on the audience constitute deception, or is this just 
necessary political maneuvering without which no research is possible? And finally, if informed 
consent is established by providing the participants with a long list of reasons for why 
participation is dangerous and potentially harmful to them, why in the world would anyone want 
to participate at all? This is especially the case when any potential outcomes of the research are 
much more likely to benefit only the funders of the study who seek the knowledge on how to 
undermine the “well being” of the participants themselves through effective counterterrorism. 
Are researchers really expected to attempt to talk willing interviewees out of speaking to them by 
presenting an exhaustive list of possible dangers of participation? 
In conclusion, dealing with IRB/HREC processes can be a frustrating exercise, and despite the 
insistence of such bodies that their job is not to make the research impossible but rather to raise 
awareness of the ethical issues involved, the impression researchers sometimes get after going 
through the ethics review process is quite the opposite. This is unfortunate because ethical 
considerations are important, and the whole exercise could potentially be a good opportunity for 
researchers to genuinely consider the possible implications of their actions in dilemmatic 
situations that they may encounter in the course of research. Unfortunately, the frequently 
unqualified micromanagement from the side of ethical review bodies often forces researchers to 
avoid the process at all costs,[46] creating a lose-lose situation for everyone, including the 
research participants. 
A more productive approach would be for IRB/HRECs to use their experience to alert the 
researchers to issues they may have not considered, while simultaneously placing greater trust in 
the conscience and ability of researchers to make decisions on the ground, and being less 
skeptical of the capacity of potential respondents to make their own decisions about the risks of 
participation. For their part, terrorism researchers can help their own case by communicating 
with their institution’s IRB/HREC prior to applying for clearances, in order to familiarize its 
members with the specifics of the research field, asking for their feedback and inviting them to a 
joint problem solving discussion about how potential ethical obstacles could usefully be 
overcome. This can create a blueprint protocol for handling specific issues in the future, and 
given the review board members’ active participation in the constructive debate in advance, they 
will likely feel greater ownership of such a protocol, and will in turn be more likely to approach 
the project constructively, as opposed to playing their not uncommon role of spoilers.[47] This 
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approach may in some cases not be successful, of course, depending on the dynamics and nature 
of the review board, personality characteristics of its members, and the institutional influence of 
the individual researcher applying for an ethics clearance. In addition, the dynamics are likely to 
be different based on the academic culture of the country where the researcher is applying. 
Because of these differences, an urgent need exists for terrorism researchers to share individual 
experiences and learn from each other’s experience in overcoming the IRB/HREC trap.
Dangers
Any researcher who has ever gone into the field to interview militants has encountered the 
common perception that such work is by definition highly dangerous. As stated in the 
introduction, this is a popular misconception, and the fact is that fieldwork on terrorism can be 
done rather safely, assuming good preparation, knowledge and prior experience. By the same 
token, such fieldwork can be incredibly dangerous for the naive and the unprepared, and 
conducting “risk free” research on terrorism is in some contexts (i.e. Somalia, Chechnya) 
practically impossible. Either way, the fact is that terrorism researchers frequently face the 
assumption that terrorism research is dangerous and thus need to have a thorough understanding 
of what the actual risks are in order to be able to address the issue when dealing with HREC/
IRB’s or University Occupational Health and Safety Units, which are more likely to be 
supportive of the research if the researcher demonstrates an understanding of the risks, as 
opposed to when he or she simply argues that the danger does not exist. While space limitations 
do not allow a comprehensive treatment of this crucial issue, the following paragraphs will 
attempt to at least briefly cover some of the most important risks that researchers encounter 
during field research. Some of the more common risks such as disease and street crime are not 
covered here, as these are outlined in the widely available general travel advisories.
The first risk that comes to the mind of most people is the danger of being kidnapped or 
murdered. Despite the fact that instances of this happening to researchers have historically been 
very rare, the threat is clearly growing. While it would be inaccurate to claim that reporters and 
academics interviewing terrorists in the 1960s through 1990s were perfectly safe, terrorist groups 
in the past typically did not see it as advantageous to harm the people whom they depended on to 
positively influence the public views of themselves and their activities by providing favorable 
coverage. However, as terrorists gained the capacity to independently access their target 
audiences and international media via the use of e-mail, designated websites, chat rooms and 
Youtube, there has been a decline in the terrorists’ dependence on journalists and researchers to 
get their “story out”, turning the activity of interviewing terrorists increasingly dangerous. 
According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) 801 journalists have been killed since 
1992, out of which 142 were killed in crossfire/combat and 581 had been murdered.[48] In this 
regard, it was especially the videotaped beheading of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl in 
Pakistan and the subsequent adoption of this tactic by Abu Musab al Zarqawi in Iraq that forever 
changed the perceptions of researchers around the world about the dangers of interviewing 
terrorists. And while “only” 76 of the total 801 journalists’ deaths occurred on what has been 
assessed as “dangerous assignments”,[49] the fact that Daniel Pearl was lured in under the 
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pretext of conducting an interview only to be kidnapped and brutally beheaded on video, also 
lingers in the heads of most researchers heading into the field. While accepting a certain level of 
personal risk comes with field research, it is one thing getting killed in a car accident, crossfire or 
by an IED, and quite another to die like Daniel Pearl - the prospect of the researcher’s family 
seeing the videotape is truly frightening. Nevertheless, kidnapping and murder of (especially 
Western) researchers by terrorist groups has been extremely rare, and researchers can manage 
this risk by proper preparation and planning. Most of the journalists who are murdered in the 
field are not killed by terrorists, but rather assassinated at the order of different power figures 
personally threatened by the individual’s reporting. 
A comparatively greater threat to researchers is kidnapping for ransom. Including unreported 
cases (which constitute up to 90% of all kidnappings[50]), it is estimated that annually 
10,000-15,000 kidnapping incidents occur worldwide[51] though the number of (expatriate) 
Westerners kidnapped annually is “only” around 200-300. The currently most prevalent locations 
for kidnapping foreigners for ransom include Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, Philippines, 
Nigeria, Iraq, Brazil, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Somalia, Nepal, India and Russia.[52] A 
more recent trend in some of these countries (i.e. Colombia and Philippines) has been the use of 
so called “express-kidnappings” in which the hostage is periodically taken to an ATM and forced 
to withdraw maximum daily limit from all his or her credit cards until the accounts run dry. 
Other than the moment of kidnapping itself, the most threatening part is being rescued, with 
40-70% of all fatalities among hostages occurring during rescue attempts. Researchers planning 
to go into the field should remember to budget for kidnap and ransom (K&R) insurance and 
kidnap survival training (discussed below) in grant applications. 
Another important threat in conflict and post conflict areas is constituted by landmines, 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and unexploded ordnance. According to some sources, 
there are an estimated 110 million active mines scattered in over 70 countries and about 2,000 
people are involved in landmine accidents every month, translating into one victim every 20 
minutes. At the current rate of some 100,000 mines being removed each year it would take 1,100 
years to rid the world of mines, but with nearly 2 million new mines being planted each year, the 
end to the threat is nowhere in sight.[53] When moving around in conflict or post conflict areas 
such as Angola, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Mozambique, the 
danger from land mines is very real and researchers should seek mine and unexploded ordnance 
recognition and response training prior to travel. 
Probably the riskiest activity researchers will ever engage in during fieldwork is simply traveling 
on roads in third world countries. According to the World Health Organization, over 1.2 million 
people worldwide are annually killed in traffic accidents and between 20-50 million suffer non-
fatal injuries.[54] No one who has traveled in the developing world will be surprised that over 
90% of the deaths occur in low-income and middle-income countries; the likelihood of being 
involved in a traffic accident while traveling in these environments is relatively high. It is 
advisable, though sometimes very costly, to hire a four-wheel drive with a reliable driver (see 
section on Getting Around). Riding motorcycle taxis (boda boda) is naturally a faster way to get 
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through congested city traffic, but it is also the most dangerous activity a terrorism researcher 
will engage in on a field trip. In such situations, it is a good idea to look for the oldest driver in 
the crowd, whose driving skill and style are proven by time and are certainly likely to be superior 
to that of his 12-year-old competitors. Spending a minute or two casually chatting to the driver to 
determine whether or not he is intoxicated by alcohol or under the influence of drugs is a good 
time investment. The same is true for paying attention to the general condition of the breaks and 
tires.
To conclude, functioning in conflict and post conflict zones has its risks, ranging from high 
profile threats like kidnapping or landmines to common threats such as disease, street crime and 
traffic accidents. A traveler’s ability to manage these risks increases rapidly with experience and 
training. Closely following the situation on the ground from local sources is key, as is paying 
attention to preventive security measures. The best source of knowledge on how to survive in 
conflict zones can be found in Robert Young Pelton's now slightly dated yet absolutely brilliant 
book The World's Most Dangerous Places,[55] which provides a humorous and very useful and 
practice- oriented guide to the world’s hotspots. It is also important to point out that contrary to 
popular perception, research on terrorism does not necessarily have to involve travel to conflict 
areas. There are many former terrorists who live in exile or are in hiding in Western and Middle-
Eastern countries. Sometimes the researcher is much better off traveling to destinations like 
London, Istanbul or Dubai, where interviews can be arranged in a safe environment. In addition, 
the interviewees there are frequently more relaxed and more open than in their home countries. 
Training
As mentioned above, one of the keys to managing risks during field research is experience and 
training. Traveling through the developing world with a backpack provides excellent opportunity 
to acquire the basic instincts, know-how, and etiquette in a less threatening environment where 
one can still learn from mistakes. In addition, undergoing one of the pre-deployment hostile 
environment survival training courses that are available for journalists and humanitarian aid 
workers is an excellent investment.
Like most researchers with incrementally growing field experience in conflict zones, I did not 
give much importance to survival training until realizing my vulnerability in a highly volatile 
situation I had encountered in Chechnya. Two years later I underwent a 9-day specialized war-
zone survival course annually organized by the Czech army for journalists, diplomats, and NGO 
workers on war-zone assignments. The course, which included prior psychological and physical 
testing, combined classroom instruction on weapons, IED dangers, outdoor orientation and radio 
communication skills, basic emergency trauma medicine, common insurgent ambush tactics, 
essentials of traveling under armed escort, CBRN awareness, practical aspects of war-zone 
survival, kidnap for ransom trends, and practical lessons on hostage survival (i.e. self-
humanization, building rapport, inducing Stockholm Syndrome etc.). Most of the course took 
place in the outdoors in the cold and rainy autumn season. It included vertical and horizontal 
repelling, rock climbing, improvised first aid, improvised hunting and trapping, CS gas 
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chambers, unarmed movement in the battlefield under fire, highly challenging obstacle courses 
and boot camp type activities - all designed to completely exhaust the participants. In the next 
stage the parameters of a simulated conflict zone were introduced, and the participants, assuming 
the role of a UN peace delegation, were moved into a field base. After facing repeated rocket fire 
in the middle of the night forcing multiple relocations to a shelter, the team eventually embarked 
on a long march in full gear in challenging terrain under pursuit. Facing ambushes, violent 
checkpoints, simulated serious injuries to members of the team, and sleeping in the forest with 
practically nothing, the participants reach a stage of complete physical exhaustion, starvation, 
sleep deprivation, and mental fatigue. This is where the exercise moved into the final stage, when 
one of the night ambushes against “government troops” was successful, and the participants were 
kidnapped by a group of armed rebels. Having been transported to a remote location, the 
participants are subject to repeated and diverse “enhanced interrogations methods”, including 
water boarding, physical and psychological pressure, prolonged periods of immersion in cold 
water and forced stress positions, attacks by fighter dogs, mock executions, “the hole”, simulated 
sexual assaults, constantly changing temperatures, and more physical abuse and sleep 
deprivation designed to completely wear the trainees down. The participants also experienced the 
mental pressure of being told that a ransom has been paid and that they are being released, only 
to have their hopes crushed by being transported to another location and “sold” to another group 
for slave labor, where the ordeal begins again. The whole course ended after the hostages were 
freed in an armed rescue operation. 
Skeptics can point to the fact that participants in such a course consciously know that they will 
not be killed, and thus do not get a good enough experience to prepare them for a real situation. 
While that is certainly true, having been stripped down, beaten, attacked by dogs, dragged in an 
arm lock on knees downhill into a stream, only to have the wind purposefully knocked out for 
the purposes of getting cold muddy water into one’s lungs, creates a situation in which the 
sensation of imminent harm becomes very real, triggering primary physical responses that are 
completely out of conscious control. The course is designed to have a highly functional purpose: 
to make each participant reach their physical and psychological limit, in order to give them an 
insight into their own reactions in extreme situations. The key to surviving prolonged captivity is 
to maintain a positive attitude and determination to survive no matter what. Having reached 
one’s limits in a course like this is supposed to create a mental blueprint for real situations in the 
future, where the history of having experienced and “survived” the same mental and physical 
sensation results in some level of familiarity with the situation, yielding a more positive and 
determined attitude. It also has many positive side effects: participants who were previously 
skeptical about potential threats become more careful, and some novices who had naïve ideas 
about war journalism or NGO work realize their lack of preparedness to deal with the challenges 
and quit the chosen career path. Overall, researchers are well advised to undergo such a course, 
which even in the less extreme commercially available versions[56] brings many valuable 
experiences that will increase the researcher’s survivability and resilience.  
Getting In
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One of the crucial parts of conducting field research is proper planning, which involves not only 
establishing initial contacts and arranging visas and travel schedules, but also includes 
preparation of questions and establishing realistic expectations as to what is achievable, and 
developing a thorough understanding of the limitations of the selected approach. It is admittedly 
difficult to do this for contexts where the researcher has no prior experience, and in such cases, it 
is useful to set modest goals and to conduct an initial scouting trip, in order to get acquainted 
with the environment and refine one’s own expectations and research approach. Such scouting 
trips can also assist in the IRB/HREC process discussed above, as having previously been in the 
country of research can be a powerful persuasive criterion when advocating the feasibility and 
safety of the project. In addition, it is very difficult to actually describe the research plan in any 
significant detail prior to actually visiting the location, as many interviews are highly 
opportunistic, and availability and willingness of interviewees to participate changes from hour 
to hour, depending on external conditions and latest developments.
Going into some terrorism-ridden countries requires little more than a visa and a plane ticket, 
while some specific areas are impossible to access without violating local laws and regulations 
(which are sometimes designed specifically with that purpose in mind). The first question that 
arises is how to address the issue of filling in the “purpose of journey” column on the visa 
applications. Since researchers are not journalists, obtaining a journalistic accreditation is 
difficult, and filing in “research” is a highly risky exercise which can result in denial of entry, 
especially in cases where local security culture views “research” as being equivalent to “spying”. 
Even if this is not the case, the researcher can subsequently be required to provide an official 
document outlining the purpose of research, sources of funding etc., which can be a time-
consuming exercise without any guarantee of success. 
That being said, this official approach can be very useful if the nature of the researcher’s enquiry 
requires assistance of government sources only, as in many cases the approval to conduct 
research will be coupled with the appointment of a contact person who helps in organizing the 
interviews within government circles.[57] However, if the research design incorporates speaking 
to militants, terrorists, or people highly critical of the government, alerting the consular officers 
about the purpose of one’s visit can be detrimental. Another risk of the official approach is that 
since the authorities have been alerted to the intention to conduct research, a rejection leaves the 
researcher with very little in the way of a backup plan, since conducting research regardless of 
explicit rejection of an application to do so is certainly seen as a worse case of misconduct than 
going on a tourist visa and dealing with any potential problems later. The safest option may be to 
apply for a generic business visa, which covers the researcher for a “work trip” and allows him 
or her to make the case that conducting research is their “business”, and thus does not technically 
constitute a violation of the visa regime. Yet another useful way of getting around the issue is 
contacting a local academic institution with an offer to deliver a free lecture, and in exchange to 
get an invitation letter from that institution for the purposes of obtaining the visa. And given the 
fact that most visa applications and immigration arrival forms ask about the “primary” objective 
of the trip, filling in “lecture” does not constitute deceit, especially if the research activity is 
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM 	   	   	   	   	   Volume	  5,	  Issue	  2
18	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   May	  2011
framed as an opportunistic secondary purpose of the trip. In any case, it makes sense to be on the 
safe side, because incorrect visas leave the researcher highly vulnerable to exploitation, 
blackmail and  deportation, which  can only complicate attainment of visas in the future. 
In many countries getting the entry visa is just the first step, and in order to enter a conflict-
ridden area it is necessary to obtain a special permission. This requires a lot of paperwork, time, 
and money - all without any guarantee of success. Again, disclosing one’s research plans can be 
dangerous, and offering too many details can preclude the researcher from doing any work in the 
field at all. One such case is Chechnya, which until recently was practically impossible for 
researchers to enter legally. Yes, if the researcher has been patient and endured enough 
bureaucratic abuse, passed all the security screenings designed to check how sympathetic his or 
her previous work had been to the official version of events (that means the only acceptable --
and typically untruthful-- version of events) one may have a chance to go on a guided bus tour to 
“Potemkin villages” where people are well-off, happy, singing, and all universally love the 
Russian government. If the researcher, however, wants to conduct serious research, these official 
trips are essentially useless. In such cases legal options are limited, and it is up to the researcher 
to determine how far they are willing to go in pursuit of their research objectives. The bottom 
line is that in most conflict zones, visas and official permissions are useful in getting the initial 
access to the area, but can become practically worthless pieces of paper once the researcher is on 
the ground. In fact, during a document check at a militant checkpoint such official 
documentation in the possession of the researcher can result in accusations of being a spy for the 
enemy, potentially creating a life-threatening situation.[58] As a result, there are no clear-cut 
answers and “do’s” and “don’ts” to follow. Obviously, having official permissions to conduct 
research is (sometimes) advantageous. Still if local security services perceive the researcher to be 
a threat at any point, they will find a way to rid themselves of the problem, whether official 
permission exists or not. In such cases, a “deportation due to violation of the visa regime” 
constitutes a rather mild outcome. 
Getting Around
Day-to-day operation in conflict areas poses specific challenges, and can be handled in different 
ways, depending on a number of factors such as the level of funding, personal threshold for 
discomfort and perceived risk, as well as Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) regulations of 
one’s employer or insurer, etc. Some employers or insurers can make a researcher’s life very 
difficult, especially during travel to countries listed by most foreign ministries on a “do not travel 
to” list (i.e. Afghanistan, Sudan, Burundi, Iraq, Central African Republic, Somalia, Chad, Niger, 
Guinea etc.) For instance, on one of my trips to Afghanistan the university generously arranged 
additional coverage with an insurer, who, however, specified the following conditions for 
coverage:
· Keep a low profile
· Meet and greet/ drop off & pick up at the airport with armed escort in B6 armoured 
vehicle
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· Daily transport in Kabul with low-profile soft skin vehicle and armed escort
· Movement outside of Kabul with armed escort in B6 armoured vehicle and Satellite 
Communications morning and evening communications schedule
· Avoid security forces installations, locations that are frequented by police and army 
personnel and government buildings in Kabul
· Emergency response and communications to be provided via local security provider 
· Adhere to strict journey management planning and issue a daily movements plan to HQ 
(e.g. local security provider)
· Register with home nation embassy to receive current threat update and alerts 
· Use approved accommodation only – secure guest-houses or internationally branded 
hotel such as the Serena Hotel.
Overall, this list is not so unreasonable, at least not for a businessman who wants to hold a few 
meetings with business partners in Kabul and get out as quickly as possible. But for a researcher 
on terrorism, whose interest focuses specifically on the sources of the threat, following these 
rules would make any meaningful research activity impossible.[59] Moreover, in addition to 
prohibitive costs, following many of the other regulations actually turns the researcher into a 
high profile target, as driving around in an easily identifiable Toyota landcruiser and an 
entourage runs somewhat contrary to the instruction to “keep a low profile.” Staying in hotels 
like the Kabul Serena poses additional risks, as confirmed by the January 14th 2008 twin suicide 
attack in which Taliban militants penetrated the Serena and killed 6 people in the hotel’s gym,
[60] or the January 18th 2010 attack on the Serena, several shopping malls and the presidential 
palace, in which 5 people died and 71 were wounded.[61] 
I opted for a compromise solution, by choosing a hotel in a less high-profile part of town which 
housed few foreigners and practically no westerners, was almost 80% cheaper and still had 
several guards at the front door. And while this hotel was not as well protected against a possible 
vehicle born improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack as the Serena due to its closeness to 
the road and absence of blast mitigating barriers, it was at the same time a much less likely target 
for such a tactic due to its low profile and the close proximity to a Sunni mosque, which at the 
time still provided some deterrent to the employment of a large scale VBIED in the area.[62] 
Another option is staying with locals, which besides cost effectiveness can also be very useful in 
improving the researcher’s credibility with the local population, as well as access to new sources.
[63] When considering this choice it is vital to assess the security situation and the researcher's 
ability to reasonably fit in. The downside of this approach is the practical impossibility of 
sufficient rest, which can lead to complete exhaustion due to social activities, the local 
population's hospitality and the all-important process of actively communicating with people for 
20 hours per day, especially in a foreign language. 
In terms of travel, a similar range of options exists - using local buses and taxis, hiring a car with 
a driver, or traveling with armed escort. Each of these options presents specific challenges and 
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risks. For local transportation within cities, local taxis are usually sufficient, though in areas 
where kidnapping is prevalent, several rules should be followed. First of all, it is generally a 
good idea for the researcher to be the one selecting the taxi driver (as opposed to being the one 
selected), in order to avoid drivers that are potentially fishing for a prospective kidnap victim. In 
addition, it is important to rely on instinct, which is something that Westerners are not used to 
doing on a daily basis, because our lives are more or less straightforward and follow certain 
predictable rules and regulations. Quite simply, if driving into the mountains with a specific 
person does not feel right, for whatever reason, then do not do it. Even if the driver is a friend of 
a friend and even if turning him down will create a slightly socially uncomfortable situation, 
going against one’s instincts is simply not worth the risk. Even among drivers that do “feel 
right”, it is a good idea to go with experienced people who are preferably from the area to be 
visited, know the roads and have local contacts. Do not feel bad about “shopping around”, as 
experienced drivers also assess the risk factors involved in the trip before deciding whether to 
accept the business. Admittedly, for some destinations there are not many drivers to choose from. 
In any case, it is prudent to be kind to drivers and to treat them like brothers, as they will be the 
ones on whom the researcher’s life may depend on in moments of crisis.[64] 
The same general rule applies to travel with armed escort, even in situations where the escort 
consists of soldiers or policemen assigned by the local government. For someone who is getting 
paid US $3 per day, protecting the researcher may be a very low priority if the situation gets 
messy, unless the former takes active steps toward giving them a personal stake in the matter. 
Giving guards cigarettes (depending on context and religious prohibitions), treating them for a 
meal or drink, remembering their names, asking about their families, sharing one’s own food, or 
giving them  small presents for their children will go a long way in increasing their loyalty. 
Creating bonds based on similarity and showing a sense of humor is key. The same goes for the 
many checkpoints researchers will encounter along the way. Here are a few rules to follow:
• Be patient, friendly, smile a lot.
• Do not give the impression of being in a hurry; this only drives the price up.
• Even if you have written permission to enter, do not be surprised if you are told 
that it is “not valid”. 
• Just because the checkpoint is manned by “the good guys” do not expect them to 
be friendly. The guards are frequently on edge, suspicious, traumatized, and 
facing constant danger of ambush, while being underpaid (if paid at all). 
• Engage in small talk, share food and cigarettes, pass on souvenirs. Even small 
friendly gestures go a long way. 
• Do not pay bribes. Making a personal bribe will leave you exposed and vulnerable 
to exploitation. If making a payment is unavoidable, ask the driver to negotiate 
and make the payment on your behalf, and reimburse him later. 
• Leave a trail to make it easier for people to look for you.[65]
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM 	   	   	   	   	   Volume	  5,	  Issue	  2
21	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   May	  2011
Making Contact
Making contact with terrorists is not as difficult as most people imagine. In practically any 
country it is possible to find people (usually journalists) who have studied the respective conflict 
for many years, speak the language and have had extensive prior dealings with the militant 
groups; they also often possess all the necessary phone numbers and contacts. These journalists 
never get the credit in the Western world they deserve for their expertise. The fact is that they are 
frequently extremely knowledgeable and helpful, taking serious risks in the field without any 
protection, insurance coverage, or reasonable remuneration. Many get kidnapped or killed in the 
line of duty (92 percent of all journalists killed on duty are local journalists)[66] without coming 
even close to the recognition granted to their Western colleagues. 
It is specifically the generous help of local journalists that can provide a researcher with the all-
important introduction to initial contacts.[67] And while many journalists may not logically be 
rushing to share such details with people that might be deemed as potential competition, being a 
researcher (as opposed to member of press) eases the situation, and many journalists are 
genuinely happy to assist without asking for anything in return. In other cases, cooperation can 
be incentivized, especially when the journalists realize that the researcher’s expertise and 
network of contacts in other places around the world can be very useful to them as well. 
Similarly, agreeing to be interviewed for their articles or talk shows can constitute a useful quid 
pro quo gesture. In some cases, local journalists can benefit from arranging an interview with 
high-level officials themselves, as these figures can sometimes be persuaded to talk to a Western 
professor at a time when they would be reluctant to find the time to meet a local journalist.[68] 
And finally, many local correspondents in conflict areas also make a living as fixers for their 
Western colleagues; their services can be hired for a payment. Such an option can be attractive at 
many levels, as it is time efficient, fair, and can help the researcher maintain a professional 
distance and reduce feelings of obligation, which in turn can help the researcher to be more 
assertive in asking for what he or she wants. Further, a fixer can sometimes also serve as an 
interpreter and a driver in one person, reducing the overall expenditure. 
When working with fixers, there are several things to keep in mind. First of all, it is typically 
better to pay fixers on the basis of meetings arranged, as opposed to a daily basis, as this 
encourages greater efficiency. Secondly, in some cases it is advisable to enlist the assistance of 
multiple fixers, as it is not infrequent for fixers to grossly overstate their reach and connections. 
By relying on one fixer the researcher risks wasting valuable time only to discover that the 
particular person cannot deliver. Also, each fixer will have a different network of contacts, which 
results in greater diversity of potential interviewees. Thirdly, as a responsibility to other 
researchers who will come in the future and who may not have a great deal of research funding, 
it is important to always negotiate the price for these services down as much as possible, in order 
to prevent the inflation of fixer/interpreter prices to unaffordable levels. In media attractive 
conflicts, the prices for these services quickly skyrocket, as resource abundant media companies 
move in and inflate the market. Skillful negotiation based on the argument that researchers are 
not journalists and do not have that kind of money can, in some cases, bring the price down by 
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50 percent.[69] Fourthly, it is not necessary to use fixers for interviews that researchers can 
easily arrange by themselves or via existing contacts. In most cases, when working in a new 
context where the researcher has no prior experience, fixers can be useful for establishing the 
initial “foot in the door”, after which the researcher can use the snowball technique to 
significantly expand and build up his or her own network. Fifthly, researchers should be aware of 
the possibility of fixers (or interpreters and drivers) doubling as informants for the security 
services, resulting in a direct threat to the researcher and his interviewees.[70] On a final note, it 
should be noted that paying for access to sources can result in various scams, especially in media 
popular conflicts where the lucrative nature of the fixing business does not escape many creative 
minds. It is not unheard of for journalists in Peshawar to pay large sums of money for a phone 
interview with a “senior Taliban leader,” who happens to be the fixer’s cousin calling from a 
house next door.[71] In other cases, genuine terrorists agree to being interviewed but ask for 
money to “cover their expenses”, stating a completely inflated figure in anticipation of making a 
profit. Researchers can prevent these situations by doing their homework, knowing which 
specific people are most relevant to the research question at hand, and doing a background check 
on the individuals the fixer is trying to set up interviews with out of their own initiative. Above 
all, it pays off to use common sense - if something sounds too good to be true, it probably is. 
At the same time this is not to suggest that researchers should not be ambitious about pursuing 
meetings with persons crucial in their research, and should not a priori assume that something is 
impossible. Interviewing government ministers, generals and other high officials is in most 
countries surprisingly easy. High-level leaders of terrorist groups who are hiding in mountains 
and jungles with large sums of money offered as a reward on their head are naturally much more 
difficult to get to, but there is typically also a large number of lower level leaders, commanders, 
sympathizers, financiers, ideologues etc., who can usefully be interviewed. Expressing repeated 
and persistent interest to speak with them, accompanied by a consistently logical narrative can 
bear fruit. Also, just because the researcher is rejected the first time he or she asks for an 
interview, does not mean that the situation is unchangeable. In fact, a blanket rejection is often 
part of the game, which helps militants separate the casually interested from those who are really 
interested. So even when rejected, calling back and asking specifically about the reason for 
rejection, (safety issues, sensitivity of topic etc.) and asking for ways that these concerns could 
be addressed is a very useful way of going about it. In short, keep coming back and make it hard 
to say “no”. [72] At the very least, researchers should strive to elicit a verbal commitment to an 
interview “next time” – since “commitment and consistency” is one of the key elements that 
drive human behaviour, an initial promise can be effectively leveraged in the future.[73]
On a final note, researchers should also be aware of the fact that interviews with terrorists almost 
never yield any ground-breaking information, especially when this is the first encounter between 
the researcher and the interviewee. Researchers should thus prepare themselves for a painstaking 
process of building trust, listening to very basic lectures on the “evil nature” of the West or the 
enemy government, standard ideological proclamations, and many conspiracy theories and 
twisted facts. This can, of course, be a highly frustrating process for a researcher who has 
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traveled a very long distance and spent a lot of time and resources on arranging the meeting in 
the first place, only to walk away with little new information. A somewhat classical example is 
the experience of Pakistani journalist Hasnain Kazim, who in a commendably honest article 
described the process of conducting an interview with a Pakistani Taliban commander in 
Islamabad. After spending a whole day changing locations and worrying about his safety, Kazim 
ended up with a thirty minute interview in which he learned absolutely nothing new.[74] Many 
interviews with “terrorists” take exactly this form, although it should be pointed out that Kazim’s 
interview can still be considered comparatively successful, since he did not spend two weeks in a 
ridiculously overpriced container accommodation at a campsite located in a malaria infested 
swamp waiting for a phone call providing instructions for a meeting that never materialized.[75] 
But while many interviews with “terrorists” reveal little new information it does not necessarily 
mean that getting any useful insights is impossible. It is all about building relationships, 
establishing trust, trying to progress further over time, coming back, and asking the right 
questions.
The Encounter
As mentioned above, it is unlikely that the researcher will acquire exceptional pieces of 
information when meeting the research subject for the first time. This is usually due to the 
limited level of rapport and trust existing at the beginning.  It is thus a good idea to focus the first  
few encounters primarily on rapport-building, with the objective of developing rapport and trust 
in order to gain better access in future interviews. Importantly, years of research have shown that 
first impressions are absolutely key - people form 60 to 80 percent of their initial opinion about a 
person in less than 4 minutes.[76] In most contexts then, the researcher has very little time to 
make a good impression, and even less time to do so by talking, especially in the absence of local 
language capabilities and working through an interpreter. Given these limitations, it is important 
to make the most of the opportunity through as many additional factors as possible. And while in 
most cases simply being polite and respectful is enough for the researcher; to be accepted, there 
are certain steps that researchers can take to develop their access even further. 
The first such factor is the initial greeting. Obviously, the ability of the researcher to greet people 
in their own language is the first natural step. Strict observance of local cultural practices, 
insightful handshakes and traditional hugs can also be very effective, as is local attire.[77] And 
while on a rare occasion suspicious questions about the reasons behind wearing the local dress 
sometimes arise, this can be quickly diffused by an explanation that as a visitor in their country, 
the researcher is trying to show respect to local custom, which also presents a good opportunity 
to express disapproval of the way in which Western culture is often forcibly imposing itself on 
the locals. The initial encounter alone typically gets the interview off on the right foot. Of course, 
when interviewing officials and members of the security forces, the researcher is well advised to 
wear a suit and tie instead, because traditional clothing can be seen by power elites as backward, 
and when worn by foreigners, a bit tacky. This does not mean of course, that researchers in field 
conditions will always be expected to have a neatly pressed suit for official meetings. The point 
is to understand what sort of influence one can gain by indirect factors, and to maximize these to 
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM 	   	   	   	   	   Volume	  5,	  Issue	  2
24	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   May	  2011
his or her advantage. Obviously, age and gender also play an important role, but these are factors 
the researcher can rarely influence.
As suggested above, the second important factor is body language, and training oneself to be 
aware of what signals one sends and how these are likely to be perceived by the other side, is a 
core skill of any effective communicator. This is especially true during interviews with terrorists 
and their ideologues, whose logic and statements may quickly offend the researcher, who can 
inadvertently give this negative internal reaction away by sending dismissive or defensive 
signals. Having the ability to quickly identify one’s own posture and quickly substituting 
negative or defensive signals for more friendly and open ones, can be the key difference between 
success and failure in terms of creating a bond. 
Similarly, in the initial encounter with a shady character it pays off to consciously assume 
confident but open and non-threatening body language, with open palms up and frequent smiles, 
and a periodic but non-continuous eye contact.[78] In addition, knowledge of body language can 
also help researchers in basic orientation while spending time among people whose language 
they do not speak, and in gauging attitudes at checkpoints. Further, body language research has 
shown that not only is body language reflective of our emotions, changes in body posture can 
also influence the way we feel. When encountering negative postures at checkpoints, the 
researcher can use knowledge of body language not only to detect the attitudes, but also to find 
the appropriate opportunity to initiate a level of bonding, e.g. by sharing food and drink with the 
fighters. Not only is sharing a natural social lubricant,[79] handing an unfriendly combatant a 
bottle to hold can break his defensive posture, which in turn can make him feel less defensive.
[80] While there is no space in this article to elaborate on all the benefits and caveats of 
analyzing body language, a wealth of literature exists that can help prospective researchers in 
their effort to learn this important skill.[81] It is also important to emphasize that body language 
is notoriously cultural, and that reading signals accurately takes time, practice and deep 
knowledge of cultural variations.[82] 
Thirdly, language matters, and if the researcher can communicate directly with the locals and 
conduct interviews without relying on an interpreter, this introduces a much faster rapport 
building process and overall a more effective approach.[83] This does not mean that working in 
environments where the researcher does not speak a foreign language is impossible. But it is 
certainly more difficult and researchers will have to adjust their expectations accordingly. But 
even here  a caveat is in place; despite the clear benefits of knowing the local language it is not 
always advantageous to disclose this ability, for the sake of clarity and safety.[84] 
To conclude, there are many specific steps a researcher can take in the initial encounter to make a 
favorable impression, and to begin to earn trust with the research population, and to build it 
further up over time. Trust of course, is absolutely key - without trust any meaningful research is 
unlikely. As observed by Norman, “the cognitive dimension of trust has been analyzed through 
rational choice methodologies such as game theory in which trusting relationships are defined by  
an implicit assumption that one person will not deliberately hurt the other to satisfy his own 
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needs.”[85] But as Norman also points out, it is emotional trust (one based not so much on 
reason or rationale, but rather on personal relationships) that is even more important. Both 
cognitive trust and emotional trust then reinforce each other and combine  into behavioral trust. 
This is essentially based on reciprocity; it grows with time and observed actions.[86] This 
suggests that in-depth field research is highly dependent on building trust over time, and 
reinforcing it with one’s actions. It is therefore advisable to make several trips into the same area, 
and initially focus on rapport-building by engaging in communal activities, active listening, 
avoiding difficult or controversial questions, and spending social time with research participants.
[87] Knowledge of, or at least an observable desire to learn about local culture, history, religion 
etc., openness and friendliness will go a long way, as will making people feel that they really 
matter to you. Learning at least a few phrases in the local language, knowing how to accept 
hospitality, eating enthusiastically with locals regardless of how unappetizing or unhygienic the 
meal,[88] offering to help with work, paying a visit without asking for anything at all, playing 
football with children, and being pleasant company – all of these steps can make a crucial 
difference.
The Interview
Effective interviewing is a skill, which needs to be developed and practiced. Unfortunately, this 
skill is taught at universities only superficially (if at all), and there is a prevailing assumption that  
interviewing is something all academics know how to do. However, effective interviewing is not 
just about asking from a list of questions; the manner in which the questions are asked, and the 
reactions of the interviewer to the answers both directly influence how much relevant data he or 
she will get. In addition, academics are not a population widely known for strong communication 
skills, which may be the reason why we are frequently stereotyped as being somewhat socially 
awkward. On the one hand, academics are used to lecturing and conveying complex concepts 
through presentations, so speaking and expressing one’s ideas is rarely the problem. On the 
downside (and perhaps as a direct result of the former), most academics are generally not very 
good listeners, which is a major obstacle to being an effective communicator for purposes of 
collecting interviews in the field. This is especially the case in interactions with the “common 
folk”, which typically entails engaging in politically incorrect, simple, and highly opinionated 
and biased conversations with lay people about subjects that academics either know very little 
about, or in contrast, have an excessively more complex and qualified view of. Whether it is a 
product of social elitism or a simple lack of confidence, the fact is that such situations do make 
most academics uncomfortable.[89] The problem is that during field interviews with combatants 
of any kind, academics will typically find themselves talking precisely to simple, not very 
educated men (and sometimes women), who tend to have a very one-dimensional view of the 
world, and to whom they will find it very difficult to relate. This can constitute a crucial obstacle 
in the effort to capitalize on the opportunity to acquire valuable insights through interviews, 
which is a pity given the fact that the researcher has invested valuable time and resources to gain 
access to interviewees in the first place.[90] 
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The good news for those of us who are not so lucky as to have a natural talent for effortlessly 
building instant rapport with just about anyone, this is a skill that can be acquired. The key is 
realizing one’s own deficiency in this area in the first place, and then pro-actively train oneself in 
acquiring the necessary tools. There is a wide variety of excellent literature on effective 
communication and its principles that can be consulted and training for dealing everyday 
situations is possible without much additional effort. Forcing ourselves into making contact with 
strangers, building conversations with people we would not normally talk to, and acquiring the 
discipline to actively listen to views that we strongly disagree with - these are all good 
opportunities to train.
The key principle in effective interviewing is the use of active listening, a loose system of style, 
manner and technique that demonstrates the listener’s caring, concern, and attentiveness.[91] 
Useful communication techniques in this regard include paraphrasing, reflection, asking 
clarifying questions, open-ended probing, interpretation, and self-disclosure.[92] The purpose is 
to make the subject feel “heard”, satisfying one of the core needs we all have as people.[93] Not 
only does the interviewer’s attentive style encourage a greater sharing of information, it can also 
have a positive rapport-building effect; especially with people who see themselves as self-
defending victims who frame their involvement in terrorism as the “only way to be heard”. An 
essential part of this effort is to maintain the mindset in which the interviewer is not talking to a 
“terrorist,” but rather to a rational human being who, for some set of reasons, has chosen – or felt 
forced into - an extreme, violent course of action.[94] Militants rarely dispute the observation 
that their actions are extreme; they do however see them as justified. This acknowledged 
extremity of terrorism is one of the possible reasons why militants have a tendency to 
passionately explain and rationalize their actions, especially when speaking to a Westerner whom 
they perceive, (at least initially) as someone who is judging them and who does not understand 
the true drivers and “root causes” of their actions. This is where actively listening to their 
grievances and validating some of their frustrations helps contradict many of the terrorists’ 
demonized perceptions of “Westerners”, and makes it harder for them to label the researcher as 
unreasonable, creating chances to build rapport and increase trust. 
A specific challenge is then posed by interviews conducted through an interpreter, since in many 
cases the interpretation process constitutes the single greatest obstacle to a successful interview. 
First of all, most interpreters willing to work in conflict zones have a less than perfect knowledge 
of the English language and have no formal interpretation training, which creates considerable 
room for error. Secondly, interpreters are frequently difficult to control, have their own agendas, 
often do not translate what the researcher or the interviewee considers important and sometimes 
interject their own opinions and interpretations on the subject of the interview into both the 
question and the answer. Less experienced interpreters also sometimes interpret in reverse, 
starting with the last point made and working backwards to the beginning of the question posed, 
completely negating the effects of a carefully and diplomatically crafted question on a sensitive 
topic. Thirdly, interpreters sometimes have their own discussions on the side with the 
interviewee, failing to interpret its content to the researcher in the process. Fourthly, interpreters 
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are typically not well versed in the art of interviewing, which can result in the negation of the 
potential benefits of using some of the aforementioned communication techniques. For this 
reason, it is advisable to set firm rules for the interview process beforehand and to brief the 
interpreter on the principles of active listening, explaining that when the researcher asks 
clarifying questions it is all part of the technique. It is therefore not helpful if the interpreter, 
instead of translating the clarifying question, simply answers affirmatively on behalf of the 
interviewee, as this will fail to convey the message of the interviewer’s attentiveness and keen 
interest. By the same token, working effectively with interpreters also requires preparation and 
experience on behalf of the interviewer. The one crucial mistake people tend to make when 
interviewing or negotiating through interpreters is that they talk to the interpreter instead of the 
subject. In such indirect conversation, speakers have a tendency to face the interpreter, and 
convey their questions and comments in a very factual, monotonous, and emotionless voice. To 
the interviewee, who does not understand what exactly is being said and has only the tone of 
voice to go on, this can sound like an indifferent, uninterested, even dismissive questioning – 
creating exactly the opposite effect of what the researcher should strive to achieve. 
To avoid this situation it is important to face the interviewee and speak to them directly, to 
maintain eye contact and an attentive posture in the process of asking questions, as well as when 
listening to the answers. Further, body language research has shown that people tend to talk three 
to four times more when the listener nods their head using groups of three nods in regular 
intervals. Especially slow nods in deliberate clusters coinciding with the interviewee making a 
point are very powerful in conveying the interviewee’s interest.[95] Crucially, this dynamic is the 
same whether using an interpreter or not, and it is sensible to focus on the interviewee in the 
same way as if he or she spoke in a language the interviewer understands. The same gestures 
should then be repeated during consecutive interpretation, to further reiterate one’s interest and 
understanding of what has been said. In addition, due to cause and effect and the contagious 
nature of head-nodding, engaging in this practice will also cause the other side to reciprocate, 
creating a more favorable impression of the interviewer. Finally, continuing to nod for several 
seconds after the interviewee has finished speaking, generally encourages the person to fill the 
silence by adding additional information, which can be further encouraged by the listener’s hand-
to-chin evaluation gestures. Overall, head nodding is an excellent rapport-building tool across 
most cultures.[96]
Traps Impacting on the Interpretation Phase
Most interviews in the Terrorism Studies field are unstructured, using open-ended questions in 
order to allow for a greater breadth of data. Whereas structured interviewing seeks to collect 
precise data that can be coded and that can be interpreted through a set of prescribed categories, 
unstructured interviewing seeks to gain insights about the complex behavior of the subject 
without pre-imposing limitations on the interpretation of the information.[97] This also means 
however, that unstructured interviews leave a wide-open playing field for subsequent 
interpretation of the data, which, however, can be subject to many biases and interferences. 
These can be based on multiple internal and external factors as well as underlying assumptions. 
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM 	   	   	   	   	   Volume	  5,	  Issue	  2
28	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   May	  2011
This section focuses on the biases and traps involved in interpreting data collected via interviews 
in the field. 
Given the elusive nature of terrorists and their activities, most of the interviews are highly 
opportunistic, which raises the issue of limited representativeness of the data. It is important to 
recognize that the findings of any study based on interviews with terrorists only apply to the 
population of terrorists who are willing to speak to a Western researcher, which, by itself, may be 
a minority. Similarly, when interviewing “terrorists” it is important to distinguish between 
different roles that people play within terrorist organizations. Most interviews will be conducted 
with leaders, spokespersons, and ideologues of the group; that means with people who do not 
necessarily participate in actual killing. These people frequently come across as intelligent, 
worldly, and educated, which is a characteristic that may not be representative of the rank-and-
file fighters (who typically form the majority of the group). Moreover, in the case that the 
purpose of these interviews is to determine the characteristics of people who become terrorists, 
then such a study might give too much credit to variables such as “education” and “intelligence,” 
while simultaneously missing the importance of the “capacity to inflict violence” variable, 
simply because of limited representativeness of the data. The final example comes from the 
realm of the popular area of suicide terrorism, where many of the insights about this 
phenomenon are based on interviews with “suicide bombers”. The problem in this case is similar, 
as the people interviewed represent only the population of failed suicide terrorists, which may be 
quite different in their thinking and personal characteristics from the population of their 
‘successful’ colleagues, who for obvious reasons, can no longer be interviewed. Some of these 
limitations in empirical research are inherent, but openly acknowledging them as qualifiers for 
one’s findings is an important part of the research process. 
The second bias lies in the process of the interview itself, which tends to be influenced by a 
combination of different factors. Some of these factors include liking, rapport, language ability, 
the environment in which the interview takes place, etc. In other words, it is not so much about 
what questions the researchers is asking, but also the manner and sequence in which these 
questions are asked, that determine what the answers will be. In fact, different researchers could 
be posing exactly the same questions to the same respondent, and could receive significantly 
different answers depending on what level of rapport and trust exists between them and the 
interviewee, and under what conditions the interview is taking place. Timing of the interview as 
well as the exact wording of each question are, of course, crucial as well.[98]
The third critical issue, as observed by Goodhand, is that conflict creates an “information 
economy” in which the political situation privileges some voices while suppressing others, thus 
enabling powerful actors to manipulate the content of information and control its dissemination.
[99] Field research then involves choices about which voices are heard, and whose knowledge 
counts.[100] The fact is that such decisions are not always the sole product of the researcher’s 
methodological choice as these are heavily influenced by the environment. For instance, factors 
such as greater ease of access, sense of familiarity, comfort and security, often leads researchers 
to privilege information coming from capital cities at the expense of information coming from 
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rural areas. And since capital cities are also more tightly controlled by governments, this may 
inadvertently privilege government narratives.[101] Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent than 
in terrorism research where state narratives are often by default given much more credibility and 
attention than those of the “terrorists”. 
A closely related danger in field research is the problem of so-called “seduction”, or a situation 
in which the researcher’s objectivity is impacted by favors granted by a party to the conflict, such 
as providing exclusive access to data or sources, allowing the researcher to embed him or herself 
with a combat unit, or simply by being friendly and hospitable. The fact is that even if such acts 
of “seduction” (whether deliberate or unintentional) are fairly obvious, as human beings we are 
programmed to find it difficult to feel indebted, and have a tendency to repay favors.[102] 
Whether researchers admit it or not, the principle of reciprocity does affect their views, and 
consequently the level of critique of government policies in the author’s conclusions will at least 
partially reflect the way the researcher was treated by the government while spending time in the 
country. By the same token, this situation can also exist in reverse. Researchers who spend time 
among militants on their territory and could potentially become easy victims of kidnapping, find 
themselves subject to a variation of the Stockholm Syndrome, or the mutually positive 
relationship between captives and their captors that frequently occurs in hostage situations.[103] 
The researcher’s awareness of his or her own vulnerability, can result in feelings of gratitude 
toward the militants for not exploiting the situation, which then by itself can cause the researcher 
to view the militants more favorably than he or she might have if presented with exactly the 
same data in a more detached setting.[104] And as observed by Zahar in “giving voice to the 
voiceless we could fall for another bias: either accepting the ‘counter-hegemonic’ discourse of 
the non-state actors at face value or imposing upon them our own interpretation of the situation 
and romanticizing their reality.”[105]
On a final note, researchers should be aware of the principle of scarcity, or the natural human 
tendency to assign more value to that which is difficult to attain.[106] In other words, researchers 
subconsciously tend to assign greater meaning to data that was difficult for them to acquire, or 
data to which they have exclusive access. In reality, the information gained from an interview in 
the process of which the researcher was nearly killed, or a classified document that the researcher 
spent months trying to get access to, could be less meaningful than information available in open 
secondary sources more easily accessible over the internet. But the human tendency to assign 
greater value to the former can easily skew the researcher’s conclusions, frequently without him 
or her even being aware of it. Although the value of researching terrorism in the field is clear, it 
is important to remember that the fact that a certain piece of information comes from an 
interview with a terrorist does not necessarily make it the “Holy Grail.”[107] 
Conclusion
Greater emphasis on field research is the clear next step in taking the discipline of Terrorism 
Studies to the next level. Field research is useful in helping researchers in navigating with greater 
certainty through multiple contradictory versions of events available in open sources. It 
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contributes to counterbalancing some of the key research biases that inherently exist. It also 
enhances the reliability and accuracy of findings, and above all, the process itself can be highly 
beneficial in educating the researcher by allowing him or her to acquire a tacit knowledge of the 
context. But while many researchers have answered the call and have ventured into the field, 
there is still an acute absence of attempts to share the know-how on the intricacies of the step-by-
step process of conducting such research. This is needed in order to enable other researchers to 
build on the experiences of their colleagues and to learn from their insights and mistakes. 
One key aspect that was not covered sufficiently here is the need to demystify the everyday 
reality of field research. The majority of time spent in field research involves idleness and even 
boredom. Myriads of phone calls to contacts are often followed by endless hours and days of 
waiting for a return call that may or may not come. Interviews with active terrorists, if they 
actually materialize, are often not nearly as insightful as people expect: the frustrated researcher 
often walks away with a basic lecture on the group’s ideology and stated grievance; something of 
which the researcher who has done his homework typically has a deeper knowledge of than the 
interviewed terrorists themselves. Former terrorists are a more “user friendly” population, as 
their disengaged position allows them to share more details.[108] Such interviews are frequently 
more interesting – yet still inherently limited in their representativeness. Most meetings with 
local government officials, investigators and intelligence agencies are full of predictable 
propaganda. Any information acquired in such meetings needs to be treated with a healthy dose 
of scepticism. And, to make matters more difficult, in most cases, after a long enough exposure 
to the conflict, the overall picture becomes much more blurred for the researchers than it was 
back at the university office where the illusion of having objective, exact knowledge that could 
be neatly compartmentalized into typologies still may have existed. Instead, researchers exposed 
to the greyness of everyday reality of conflict zones where no information can be fully trusted 
and everything is open to alternative interpretations, may start to second-guess almost everything 
they thought they knew for sure.  After realizing how different their perceptions of a given 
conflict are as a result of direct first-hand experience, researchers may start to doubt absolutely 
everything they have learned through standard academic study about other conflicts and terror 
campaigns as well. Often the more a researcher learns, the greater the number of questions that 
arise. This state of “confusion” and “uncertainty about anything” is possibly the greatest non-
physical “danger” of field research.
Similarly, functioning in conflict zones involves much time spent in frustration while dealing 
with even simple logistical issues, rather than the hoped for but rather rare experience of 
excitement and action. The limited ability to move around freely often leaves the researcher in 
desperate need of some physical activity. However unless one is staying at a ridiculously 
overpriced hotel completely secluded from the local everyday reality, the security environment 
makes opportunities for exercise practically non-existent. Being perpetually stereotyped and 
constantly treated as a potential threat, does not add to the enjoyment of the experience, 
especially for those academics that are used to being treated with at least some respect. The 
perpetually busy and fast-paced terrorism specialist often cannot escape the thought whether 
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there is not something more rewarding and productive to be done in the field than endless 
waiting, coupled with constant uncertainty and only doubtful prospects of achieving the 
imagined results.
Coming home after weeks or months in a conflict environment is not easy either. Whether the 
researcher admits it or not, spending endless hours talking to victims and perpetrators of political 
violence about massacres of civilians in gruesome detail and constantly having to worry about 
one’s own safety, does take its toll. But despite all these unpleasant by-products there is 
something invaluable that field research does contribute: an overall increased understanding of 
the context in which terrorism occurs. This incremental acquisition of a more insightful, sceptical 
and nuanced lens through which the researcher processes subsequently incoming information on 
a conflict of terror campaign is simply priceless - it cannot be acquired in any other way than 
through direct exposure to the field. In the end, it may well be that the “greyness” and 
“confusion” of the researcher resulting from this experience simply represents an more advanced 
level of knowledge.   
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